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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ERIC RICHARD ALBAN, 
Petitioner and Appellee, 
v. 
JENNIFER ALBAN, 
Respondent and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Case No. 20060985 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ms. Alban's Statement of Facts adopts the trial court's Findings and Conclusions. For 
clarity, Mr. Alban highlights the following Findings and Conclusions: 
1. In the January 23, 2004 divorce matter, the trial court ordered that for 35 months, from 
February 2004 through December 2006, Mr. Alban pay alimony to Ms. Alban of $4,500, so that 
Ms. Alban could attend school and obtain her teaching certificate. In the months during that time 
(February 2004 through December 2006) that Ms. Alban was not attending school, alimony 
would decrease to $3,000 per month. From January 2007 alimony would reduce to $2,000 per 
month, terminable upon Ms. Alban's remarriage, cohabitation, death of either party, or a period 
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of time equal to the length of the marriage, (paragraph 12 of the Petitioner's Proposed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, adopted by reference in the trial court's memorandum decision 
ofJuly20,2006) 
2. That the trial court's order in the 2004 divorce was based on the following: 
i. Ms. Alban's testimony that being a teacher would maximize her ability to be 
with the children while still providing a reasonable wage, (page 3, paragraph 3 of 
the trial court's memorandum decision of July 20, 2006) 
ii. Ms. Alban's trial testimony was that Ms. Alban "would be engaged full-time as a 
student seeking a teaching certificate", (page 10, paragraph 16, trial court's 
memorandum decision of July 20, 2006) 
iii. The reduction of alimony commencing with January 2007, was based on Ms. 
Alban's testimony that she would be working as a teacher by that time, (page 8, 
paragraph 15 of the trial court's memorandum decision of July 20, 2006) 
iv. The award of alimony "was to allow the parties to be treated equitably and 
require each to work for their support", (page 10 of the trial court's 
memorandum decision of July 20, 2006) 
v. Ms. Alban's reasonable monthly expenses of $4,500 included college tuition 
expenses and an allowance for taxes on alimony, (paragraph 12 of the 
Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, adopted by 
reference in the trial court's memorandum decision of July 20, 2006) 
vi. At the time of the divorce, Mr. Alban had gross monthly income of $13,339 and 
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disposable monthly income of $9,860, and reasonable monthly living expenses of 
$3,800. (paragraph 12 of the Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, adopted by reference in the trial court's memorandum 
decision of July 20, 2006) 
vii. Based on Mr. Alban's gross monthly income of $13,399, and no income being 
imputed to Ms. Alban, and utilizing the sole custody child-support obligation 
worksheet, Mr. Alban was ordered to pay child support of $1,400 per month, 
(paragraph 13 of the Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, adopted by reference in the trial court's memorandum decision of July 20, 
2006) 
viii. The parties had agreed to calculate child-support utilizing the sole custody child-
support obligation worksheet, although the joint custody child-support obligation 
worksheet could have been utilized, (paragraph 13 of the Petitioner's Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, adopted by reference in the trial 
court's memorandum decision of July 20, 2006) 
3. Following the modification trial held on July 17, 2006, the trial court ordered that 
alimony of $3,000 be paid through August 2006, that from September 2006 through and 
including December 2007 alimony would be $2,000 per month, and commencing with January, 
2008, alimony would reduce to $500 per month. 
4. The trial court's order in the 2006 modification matter was based on the following: 
i. Ms. Alban abandoned her plan to seek a teaching certificate, (page 4 of the trial 
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court's memorandum decision of July 20, 2006) 
Ms. Alban's abandonment of her plan to obtain a teaching certificate was largely 
in Ms. Alban's "own interest more than in the interests of the children", (page 4 
of the trial court's memorandum decision of July 20, 2006) 
Ms. Alban had not "made valiant or commendable or even passing efforts to 
secure employment", (page 8, paragraph 14 of the trial court's memorandum 
decision of July 20, 2006) 
Ms. Alban "has not really even attempted to work", (page 9 of the trial court's 
memorandum decision of July 20, 2006) 
Ms. Alban did not seek her teaching certificate on a full-time basis, then 
"abandoned" the goal of obtaining a teaching certificate, and that obtaining the 
teaching certificate was the basis of the original alimony award, (page 10, 
paragraph 16 of the trial court's memorandum decision of July 20, 2006) 
Based on evidence submitted by Ms. Alban, the trial court found that Ms. Alban 
could earn between $37,040 and $42,000 per year working for RedCastle 
resources, (page 11, paragraph 30 of the Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, adopted by reference in the trial court's memorandum 
decision of July 20, 2006) 
Ms. Alban's conduct "amounts to a material and substantial change in 
circumstances", (page 9 of the trial court's memorandum decision) 
The change in circumstance "is significant as it impacts the entire basis of the 
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rehabilitative alimony", (page 10 of the trial court's memorandum decision of 
July 20, 2006) 
ix. There has also been a substantial change in circumstance in Ms. Alban's ability 
to earn, (page 12, paragraph 20 of the trial court's memorandum decision of July 
20, 2006) 
x. Ms. Alban's reasonable monthly expenses are $4,500 per month, (page 6, 
paragraph 11 of the trial court's memorandum decision of July 20, 2006) 
xi. Even though Ms. Alban testified there was an opening at RedCastle, the trial 
court provided "leeway" to Ms. Alban regarding the job opening and imputed 
income at the midpoint of the income range as testified to by Ms. Alban, which 
equates to $39,500 per year or $3,292 per month, commencing with January of 
2008. (page 7, paragraph 12, of the trial court's memorandum decision of July 
20, 2006) 
xii. That Mr. Alban's reasonable monthly expenses are $4,000 per month, (page 4, 
paragraph 7 of the trial court's memorandum decision of July 20, 2006) 
xiii. That Mr. Alban's salary had decreased and also had reduced benefits, (page 5, 6, 
paragraphs 16(A), (D)) 
xiv. That due to reductions in pay, Mr. Alban's gross monthly income is $11,500. 
(page 4, paragraph 6 of the trial court's memorandum decision of July 20, 2006) 
xv. That from September 2006, through December 2007, and utilizing the joint 
custody worksheet, child-support should be computed based on Mr. Alban's 
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gross monthly income of $11,500, and Ms. Alban's gross monthly income of 
$1,666. (page 8, paragraph 14 of the trial court's memorandum decision of July 
20, 2006) 
xvi. Commencing with January 2008 child-support would be recalculated utilizing 
Mr. Alban's gross monthly income of $11,500, and Ms. Alban's gross monthly 
income of $3,292. (page 8, paragraph 14 of the trial court's memorandum 
decision of July 20, 2006) 
xvii. That the income Ms. Alban testified she would generate, coupled with alimony 
and child-support, allow Ms. Alban to meet her reasonable monthly expenses of 
$4,500. (page 10 of the trial court's memorandum decision of July 20, 2006) 
xviii.The trial court ruled that it would not require Ms. Alban to repay the educational 
alimony that Mr. Alban claimed had been overpaid, as to do so would not be in 
the best interest of the children, (pages 10 and 11 of the trial court's 
memorandum decision of July 20, 2006) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Trial Court Did Not Commit Error in Failing to Consider the Best Interest of the 
Children: The Appellant has failed to set forth case law supporting her contention that the trial 
court committed error in not considering the best interest of the children in making a 
determination whether to modify alimony. Despite the absence of a requirement that the trial 
court consider the bet interest of the children, the Findings of Fact indicate that the trial court did 
consider the best interest of the children in rejecting the Appellee's request that alimony reduce 
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sooner than ordered by the trial court. 
The Decree of Divorce Did Contemplate a Reduction of Alimony When Ms. Alban 
Obtained her Teaching Certificate: The Appellant blatantly misleads the Court in claiming that 
in the original divorce action the trial court did not contemplate a reduction of alimony when the 
Appellant obtained her teaching certificate. The trial court's Findings of Fact in the modification 
matter clearly, unequivocally, provide that alimony was to have decreased when the Appellant, 
based on the Appellant's testimony, would have obtained her teaching certificate, and be 
employed as a teacher. 
Ms. Alban has Failed to Demonstrate Unequal Treatment in Violation of Section 1 of the 
14 Amendment to the United States Constitution and Constitution of the State of Utah: The 
Appellant provides no legal authority, the Appellant provides no reasoned discussion, as to how 
or why the trial court's decision violated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. The Appellant's brief is devoid of any explanation as to whether 
the law that does apply to modifications of alimony provides unequal treatment, or whether the 
trial court incorrectly applied the law. The Appellant's brief is an emotional plea devoid of legal 
authority and legal analysis. 
The Trial Court Adequately Considered the Factors for Determining Whether to Award 
Attorney's Fees: The trial court's Findings of Fact include findings on the factors that the trial 
court is required to consider in determining whether to award fees; the Appellant's ability to pay 
her fees, and the Appellee's ability to pay the Appellant's fees if the Appellant does not have the 
ability. 
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Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Mr. Alban Should Be 
Awarded his Fees and Costs on Appeal: The Appellant's brief falls short of the requirements of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The brief is devoid of legal authority and legal analysis. 
Far worse than the absence of legal authority and sound analysis, are the continual 
misstatements. One example of many misstatements is the Appellant's statement that alimony 
was not to reduce when she obtained her teaching certificate despite clear findings to the 
contrary. In the original divorce matter, consistent with the Appellant's request the trial court 
ordered alimony in an amount that would allow the Appellant to obtain a teaching certificate, and 
when the teaching certificate had been obtained, alimony would reduce. Following the divorce 
trial the Appellant abandoned her pursuit of a teaching certificate. In the modification matter, 
the Appellant justified her abandonment of a teaching certificate by her testimony that as she had 
obtained employment that would pay her more than she would have earned as a teacher. As the 
Appellant is earning more than she originally testified she would as a teacher, she reduced her 
need for alimony. The Appellant's impassioned plea to this Court, regardless of how heartfelt it 
may be, is an impassioned plea based on misstatements of fact, and is nothing more than a 
frivolous appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE 
BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN 
The decision in Smith v. Smith, 995 P.2d 14 (Utah App. 1999), reminds that "briefs must 
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contain reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal authority", that an appellant "bears the 
burden of demonstrating the validity of her points on appeal", and faulted the appellant in that 
case for providing "no legal basis for her contention that these denials were errors". (Id. at 16, 
17) In the instant case Ms. Alban commits the same errors and deficiencies that troubled the 
court in Smith. Ms. Alban provides no legal authority, absolutely none, to support her 
contention that the trial court was required to consider the best interest of the children in 
adjusting child-support or alimony. 
In Smith, the Court pointed out that an appellant "bears the burden of demonstrating the 
validity of her points on appeal" (Id. at 16), and that as the appellant in Smith provided no legal 
analysis but "rehashes" (id. at 16) her arguments, the appellant had impermissibly "shifted the 
burden of analysis to the reviewing court". The Court made clear that it would not accept that 
burden, and it would not determine the validity of Ms. Smith's points, and affirmed the trial 
court's decision. In the instant case Ms. Alban makes emotional statements complaining of 
unfair treatment, misstates fact and fails to provide legal authority. Applying the ruling of Smith, 
this Court does not have the duty to search for legal Authority that might apply to the Appellant's 
non supported arguments and allegations, and should affirm the ruling of the trial court. 
The law that applies to the modification of alimony is set forth in Moon v. Moon, 973 
P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1999). In Moon, the Court held "as a threshold issue, before modifying an 
alimony award, the court must find a "substantial material change in circumstances not 
foreseeable at the time of the divorce". . . and that once it has been concluded that there has been 
a substantial material change of circumstances justifying modification, the court must then 
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consider the three factors set forth in Jones v. Jones, (citation omitted) to support a modification 
of an alimony award". The Jones factors are: 
1. The financial conditions and needs of the recipient spouse. 
2. The ability of the recipient spouse to provide a sufficient income for him or herself; and 
3. The ability of the payor spouse to provide support. (Id. at 438) 
As is set forth in the above Statement of Facts, the trial court made detailed findings, in 
the modification action, and in the preceding divorce trial, as to both parties' monthly expenses 
and income, as it was required to do, as has been set forth in Moon, Jones, and numerous other 
cases. 
Ms. Alban's assertion, that the trial court did not consider the interests of the children, is 
curious for reasons extending beyond her failure to provide legal authority. As is set forth above 
in the Statement of Facts, the trial court denied Mr. Alban's request that Ms. Alban repay a 
portion of alimony based upon Ms. Alban's failure to pursue an education, as "to do so would 
not be in the best interest of the children", (pages 10 and 11 of the trial court's memorandum 
decision of July 20, 2006) 
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE DID CONTEMPLATE A REDUCTION IN ALIMONY 
WHEN MS. ALBAN OBTAINED HER TEACHING CERTIFICATE 
It is undisputed, as Ms. Alban references, that the trial court contemplated she would 
pursue a teaching certificate. (Respondent's Proposed findings of Facts as adopted by the trial 
court's Memorandum Decision) After setting forth this undisputed fact, Ms. Alban makes a 
statement, that is as false a statement as can be made, that "the teaching certification did not 
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contemplate a reduction in alimony". Alimony was to reduce in January 2007, when Ms. Alban, 
according to her testimony in the divorce action, would be working as a teacher, (page 8, 
paragraph 15 of the trial court's memorandum Decision of July 20, 2006). That Ms. Alban 
would be so bold and feel sufficiently insulated from the consequence of misleading this Court is 
addressed in Mr. Albans' request for fees and costs. 
MS. ALBAN HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE UNEQUAL TREATMENT IN 
VIOLATION OF SECTION 1 OF THE 14T H AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSITUTION AND CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Ms. Alban provides absolutely no legal authority or reasoned legal argument in support 
of her assertion that she was denied equal treatment and is the victim of gender bias. It is not 
known whether Ms. Alban is contending that the test for determining a modification of alimony, 
as set forth above, is inherently unequal, or is unequal in its application by the trial court. 
On page 6 of her brief, Ms. Alban complains that Mr. Alban having made a request of the 
trial court that his parent time be modified if his work schedule was altered, a request that the 
trial court did not grant, was "an abuse of discretion". Not surprisingly, there is no legal 
authority, or argument as to how or why Mr. Alban's request for a modification of parent time, a 
request opposed by Ms. Alban, and not granted by the trial court, constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. That Ms. Alban would make an illogical, non-supported request, is addressed below 
in Mr. Alban's request for fees for the pursuit of a frivolous appeal. 
In what is more a speech designed to provoke an emotional response, than 
discussion or argument based on legal precedent, Ms. Alban decries the trial court's failure to 
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give due regard to the value of the entrepreneurial spirit. In setting forth this speech/essay, Ms. 
Alban demonstrates how poorly she understands the legal standards that were applied by the trial 
court, and displays a faulty understanding of the history of this case. Persuaded by Ms. Alban's 
testimony at the original trial that it was in the children's best interest that she obtain a teaching 
certificate and obtain employment as a teacher, the trial court awarded rehabilitative alimony that 
would decrease when Ms. Alban obtained her teaching certificate. The decrease in alimony 
ordered in the original divorce trial was based on the earnings Ms. Alban testified she would be 
entitled to as a first year teacher. Ms. Alban chose not to pursue her teaching certificate, and in 
the modification matter testified that she had secured employment that would provide greater 
income than she would have earned as a teacher. After finding a substantial change in 
circumstance, the trial court in the modification matter, applied the Jones factors, and made a 
determination of alimony based on the earnings that Ms. Alban testified she would generate, and 
what the trial court found to be Ms. Alban's reasonable monthly expenses, and Mr. Alban's 
ability to pay. 
THE TRIAL COURT ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED THE FACTORS FOR 
DETERMINING WHETHER TO AWARD ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Ms. Alban correctly sets forth the legal standard ofKellev v. Kelley, 2000 UT App, 236, 
p30, 9 P.3d 171, for determining attorney's fees. Those factors are the requesting party's need 
and the other party's ability to pay, as well as the reasonableness of the requested fees. Ms. 
Alban makes another curious statement by claiming that "the trial court erroneously failed to 
consider Ms. Alban's financial needs, Mr. Alban's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the 
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requested fees". The trial court did make thorough findings as to the financial condition of both 
of the parties, and did conclude that "neither party has shown that the other party should pay 
their fees". Ms. Alban does not challenge the trial court's Findings. Ms. Alban does not contend 
that there was insufficient evidence presented to the trial court to support the Findings. Instead, 
Ms. Alban takes the strange approach of asserting that the trial court did not consider the parties' 
economic situation, when the Findings set forth the parties' economic situation, their needs, and 
ability to pay, in fine detail. 
PURSUANT TO RULE 33 OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE MR. 
ALBAN SHOULD BE AWARDED HIS FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL 
Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appeal not "grounded 
in fact, warranted by existing law, or based on a good faith argument to extend, modify or 
reverse existing law', is frivolous. The instant appeal is frivolous. Ms. Alban's arguments are 
based on misrepresentations. As has been set more fully above, Ms. Alban claims that the trial 
court did not consider the best interests of the children, despite the trial court's refusal to reduce 
alimony sooner than it did, based on the best interest of the children. Ms. Alban offers the 
statement that the trial court did not contemplate a reduction in alimony when she obtained a 
teaching certificate despite the explicit findings that alimony would reduce in January of 2007, as 
that was when, according to Ms. Alban's testimony, she would be working as a teacher. Ms. 
Alban misrepresents that the trial court did not make findings on the factors for considering 
attorneys fees, undeterred by the trial court's detailed findings on those factors. 
Ms. Alban misstates on page 3 of her brief, in her Summary of the Arguments, that the 
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trial court "imputed phantom income" to her. This misstatement is repeated on page 4, where as 
part of her Argument, Ms. Alban again claims that the trial court "imputed income of $40,000 
per year". The truth is that Ms. Alban testified that from the employment that she had secured, 
that she would earn more than she would have as a teacher, that she would earn between $37,040 
and $42,000, and the trial court chose to utilize the mid point of $39,500 to determine her need 
for alimony, (page 11, paragraph 30, page 7, paragraph 12 of the trial court's memorandum 
decision). 
On page 7 of her Brief, Ms. Alban sets forth another misstatement, "the lower court 
erroneously imposed its perception of a livelihood upon Respondent, without a factual or legal 
basis". The truth, as amply set forth in the trial court's findings, is that in the divorce, the trial 
court awarded alimony based on Ms. Alban's testimony that it would be in the children's best 
interest that she obtain a teaching certificate and obtain employment as a teacher. In the 
modification matter the trial court based its ruling on Ms. Alban's testimony as to what she 
claimed she would earn in the employment that she, not the trial court, stated she now wished to 
pursue. 
The appeal is not warranted by existing law, or a good faith attempt to modify, or extend 
existing law. To the contrary, for the most part, Ms. Alban avoids discussion of the applicable 
law, or the legal standards and tests that the trial court did properly apply. Rather than set forth 
the applicable law, or attempt an explanation why the law that was applied, was applied 
inappropriately, Ms. Alban makes an emotional plea that invokes the greatness of the 
entrepreneurial spirit and make reference to Mr. Alban's employment. These emotional, and 
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utterly non-legal ramblings have no bearing on the fact that there is a test that requires trial 
courts to determine the existence of a substantial change in circumstance, and if there is a 
substantial change in circumstance to make a determination as to the requesting party's need for 
alimony and the other party's ability to pay that obligation, a legal test that was properly applied 
by the trial court. 
Particularly demonstrative of the frivolity of this appeal is Ms. Alban's complaint that the 
trial court's denial of Mr. Alban's request for additional parent time, a request Ms. Alban 
opposed, and the trial court denied, was an abuse of discretion. Given Ms. Alban's highly 
unusual tack of seeking redress on appeal for the trial court having ruled in her favor, when 
combined with the misrepresentations referenced above, and combined with the failure to 
provide supportive legal authority, Ms. Alban's intention must be to force Mr. Alban to incur 
legal fees, based on her belief that she is safe from being responsible for those fees. 
The trial court awarded rehabilitative alimony in a sufficient amount to allow Ms. Alban 
to do what she wanted, which was to obtain a teaching certificate so she could have the same 
schedule as the children. In tha divorce matter, the trial court ordered that alimony decrease 
when Ms. Alban commenced her teaching career, based on the income she testified she would 
earn. In the modification matter the trial court found, and Ms. Alban does accept those findings, 
that Ms. Alban, based on a decision she made, a decision that promotes her interests and not the 
interests of the children, no longer intends to be a teacher and obtained employment that will pay 
her more than she would earn had she become a teacher; all of which leads to the key and central 
point: Ms. Alban's greater earnings reduces her need for alimony. Given that the contents of Ms. 
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Alban's brief do not rise to the level of what is required and expected by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, Mr. Alban should not be financially punished for Ms. Alban's insistence of 
pursuing a frivolous appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellee respectfully requests that the ruling of the trial court be affirmed and for 
fees and costs on appeal. 
DATED this 3 day of September 2007. 
SKORDAS^CASTON/& HYDE, LLC 
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